The liability of directors for fraudulent and/or reckless trading: Section 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 by Harper, Gregory Mark
., ., 
" 
THE LIASILITY OF DIRECTORS FOR FRAUDULENT AND/ OR RECKLESS 
TRADING - SECTION 424 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 61 OF 1973 
This dissertation is presented in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements of the degree of Masters of Laws, the other 
requirements being th,e completion of a programme of courses. 
by 












The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












One of the chief principles of company law is that a company 
is a separate legal personality and that the liability of a 
member in a company, limited by shares, is limited to the 
amount, if any, unpaid on his shares. A problem down the 
years has been to prevent these principles being exploited by 
the controllers of the company, largely its directors and 
thereby to protect creditors of the company. Althou~h judges 
have at times regarded certain companies whose misdemeanours 
have come under the_ spotlight as a 'cloak' and a 'sham', 1 
the fact remains that a company as a separate legal 
personality comes into existence on the date of incorporation 
and that no recourse can be f6unded on the proposition t~at a 
company's misdemeanours cause it ipso facto to forfeit its 
existence. 
The most important statutory incursion into the principle of 
the ieparate personality of a company is contained in what 
are commonly known as the fraudulent or reckless tr~ding 
provisions of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, namely s 424. 
This provision replaces s 185 bis (1) of the Companies Act 46 
of 1926 which was derived from what is presently s 630 of the 
Companies Act (1985) of the United Kingdom (s 332 of the 
Companies Act 1948) which is still limited to fraudulent 




The Australian fraudulent trading provisions 
592(6) of the Co~porations 
provisions of the United 
presently 
contained in Section 
too, inspired by the 
Companies Legislation where the first 
Law were, 
Kingdom 
of a formulation 
statutory remedy came in response to the Greene report of 
1926. The relevant paragraph of the report reads as follows: 
"Our attention has been directed particularly to the 
case (met principally in private companies) where the 
person in control of the company holds a floating 
charge, and while knowing that the company is on the 
verge of liquidation, 'fills up' his security by means 
of goods obtained on credit and then appoints a receiver 
•.• We consider that not only should the person whom the 
court finds to have been guilty of fraudulent trading 
... be subjected to unlimited personal liability, but 
that any security over assets of the company held by him 
or on his behalf, and assigned to anyone save a bona 
fide holder for value, should be charged with liability. 
Further trading of this character should be made a 
criminal offence." 2 
Cmd. 2657 (1926) at p.28. 
3 
The particular mischief identified by 
occurred in the context of the imminent 
the Greene report 
winding-up of the 
company. As a result, the fraudulent trading provisions in 
the United Kingdom were drafted in such a way that they were 
limited to companies that were being wound-up and, indeed, 
only where t_he fraudulent trading comes to light in the 
course of the winding-up. 
The Jenkins Committee said with reference to the fraudulent 
trading provisions of the United Kingdom (thens 332 of the 
Companies Act 1948): 
"But it is further suggested that the Act does not at 
present provide a sufficient deterrent to dissuade 
directors from continuing the business of a company 
which fhey know to be hopelessly insolvent." 3 
The Committee accordingly recommended that the civil sanction 
as contained in s 332(1) be extended to include reckless 
trading and further, that the criminal offence as contained 
in s 332(3) be applicable to circumstances other than those 
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circumstances other than those where the company is in 
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process of winding-up which has now been implemented in the 
criminal offence of fraudulent trading contained in the 
present s 458 of the Companies Act 1985, have still not been 
adopted in English law but the Van Wyk de Vries Commission 
elected to adopt them. 
SECTION 424 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 61 OF 1973: AN ANALYSIS 
Section 424(1) thus reads: 
"Where it appears, whether it be in a winding-up, 
judicial management or otherwise, that any business of 
the company was or is being carried on recklessly or 
with intent to defraud creditors of the company or 
creditors of any other person or for any fraudulent 
purpose, the court may, on the application of the 
master, the liquidator, the judicial manager, any 
creditor or member or contributory of the company, 
declare that any person who was knowingly a party to the 
carrying on of the business in the manner aforesaid, 
shall be personally responsible, without any limitation 
of liability, for all or any of the debts or other 
liabilities of the company as the court may direct." 
In addition, a maximum fine of RS 000,00 or imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding two years or both may be imposed on 
5 
those persons who were knowingly parties to the fraudulent or 
reckless trading in terms of s 424(3) read withs 441{d). 
When one reads the section, one cannot but agree with De Kock 
J that one is immediately struck by the wide terms in which 
it is.cast.' The section applies when any business of the 
company ~as, or is, being carried on in a fraudulent manner 
and empowers and empowers the court to make an order that any 
person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the 
business in this manner be personally responsible for some or 
all of the debts or other liabilities of the company. This 
can all occ~r whether or not the company is in the process of 
being wound-up. 
"ANY BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY WAS OR IS BEING CARRIED ON" 
The crisp issue that came before De Kock J in Gordon NO and 
Rennie NO v Standard Merchant Bank Ltd and Others 1984 (2) SA 
519 was whether a single transaction could be regarded as 
cov~red by the words "any business was or is being 
.carried on" in the section.· De Kock J looked at ,the 
•intention of the Act and the mischief which the section was 
:attempting to prevent which was plainly to render personally 
liable any person who is knowingly a party to the carrying on 
of any business in a fraudulent manner and having regard to 
, 
1984 (2) SA 519(C) at 527A. 
6 
this held that: 
"If a transaction is part of the busin~ss of the company 
and it is executed recklessly or with intent to defraud 
creditors of the company or for any fraudulent purpose, 
it matters not, in my opinion, that it is done once or 
as part of a series of acts. In either case the guilty 
person may be visited with personal responsibility."' 
De Kock J cited with approval the words of Lord Denning in Re 
Cyona Distributors ((1967] 1 All ER 281) at 284 where he held 
with reference to section 332(1) of the English Act (nows 
630 of the Companies Act 1985) that: 
"In my judgment, that section is deliberately phrased in 
wide terms so as to enable the court to bring fraudulent 
persons to book ... In short, I think that the words of 
the section are to be given their full width." 
"WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD ... OR FOR ANY FRAUDULENT PURPOSE" 
Three possible grounds for actions exist in terms of the 
section, namely: recklessness; intent to defraud creditors; 
and any fraudulent purpose. It seems that essentially what 
is required is a definition of fraudulent intent or purpose 




and recklessness. As far as the fraudulent intent or purpose 
is concerned, our main guidance has come from English law 
where the first reported decision on what was then Section 
275 of the Companies Act 1929 held that: 
"if a company continues to carry on business and to 
incur debts at a time when there is, to the knowledge of 
the directors, no reasonable prospect of the credit-Ors 
ever receiving payment of these debts, it is, in 
general, a proper inference that the company is carrying 
on business with intent to defraud.~ 
The very next year Maugham J had another opportunity to 
consider the question of fraud and whilst stating that he was 
not going to attempt a definition of fraud, he stated that in 
the context of the section, fraud connoted "actual dishonesty 
involving, according to current notions of fair trading among 
commercial men, real moral blame."' This conception of 
fraudulent trading is much narrower than the aforementioned 
one. Farrar' suggests that these cases can possibly be 
reconciled on the basis that the later statement reflects the 
tr~e substantive legal position while the earlier one merely 
1 
at 895. 
Re William C. Leitch Bros. Ltd (no 1) [1932] All ER 892 
In re Patrick and Lyon [1933] All ER 590 at 594. 
J H Farrar: Fraudulent Tradin~ in (1980.). 
8 
gives one practical guidance on the evidence required. It 
does seem, as noted by Farrar, that in the earlier decision 
the judge talked about such evidence giving rise to an 
inference as to the intention to defraud. 
Farra:r1° states that a later decision enables one to 
reconcile the two aforementioned decisions in the manner 
suggested by himself. Buckley J said in the unreported case 
of Re White and Osmond (~arkstone) Ltd: 
"In my judgement there is nothing wrong in the fact that 
directors incur credit at a time when to their 
knowledge, the company is not able to meet all its 
liabilities as they fall due. What is manifestly wrong 
is if directors allow a company to incur credit at a 
time when the business is being carried on in such 
circumstances that it is clear that the company will 
never be able to satisfy its creditors. However, there 
is nothing to say that directors who genuinely believe 
that the clouds will roll away and the sunshine of 
prosperity will shine upon them again and disperse the 
fog of their depression are not entitled to incur credit 
and to help them to get over the bad time.~1 
10 
11 




The important thing, therefore, is to consider what the 
directors' view was of the company's position at the relevant 
time and it seems that, as noted by Williams, a purely 
subjective standard is adopted. Thus he notes that genuine 
optimism on the part of directors, though completely 
unfounded will negate an intent to defraud. 12 '.I'his, 
essentially, formed the basis of the criticism of the then 
section by the Jenkins Committee quoted above and led to 
their recommendation that the section be extended to include 
reckless trading. 
It is to be noted, before turning to the question of reckless 
trading, that there is authority in the United Kingdom that 
the cburts have lately moved away from a purely subjective 
standard towards an objective standard. Thus in R v 
Grantham, which was an appeal against a conviction of 
fraudulent trading under s 332 of the Companies Act 1948. The 
Court of Criminal Appeal found no error with the following 
direction to the jury: 
"if a man honestly believes when he obtains credit that 
although funds are not immediately available he will be 
able to pay them when the debt becomes due or within a 
short time thereafter, no doubt you would say that is 
12 RC Williams: Fraudulent Trading in (1986) 4 Company 
and Securities Law Journal 14 at 24. 
10 
not dishonest and there is no intent to defraud, but if 
he obtains or helps to obtain credit or further credit 
when he knows there is no good reason for thinking funds 
will become available to pay-the debt when it becomes 
due, or shortly thereafter, then though it is entirely a 
m•tter fot you, this qqestion of dishonesty, you might 
well think that is dishonest and that there is an intent 
to defraud."u 
The crucial words here are "when he knows there is no good 
reason" and, as noted by Williams, 11 these import a partly 
subjective and partly objective standard. There must be no 
good reason for the thinking that funds will become available 
to pay the debt objectively and the person in question must 
know that there is no good reason, subjectively. Thus this 
test, states Williams, means that unfounded optimism will not 
negate an intent to defraud. 
"RECKLESSLY" 
As has been noted above, the Van Wyk De Vries Commission 
recommended that recklessness be included as an additional 
basis for iiability under s 424 of the Companies Act 61 of 
u [19841 3 All ER 166 at 169. 
14 RC Williams: Fraudulent Trading in (1986) 4 Company 
and Securities Law Journal 14 at 25. 
11 
1973 which was duly implemented as from the beginning of 
1974. 
In S v Goertz, 15 a criminal prosecution brought under s 
424 ( 3), ·the word "recklessly" fell to be judicially defined 
for the first time. It was argued on behalf of the appellant 
that the State had to prove that the appellant carried on a 
company's business whilst foreseeing detriment to the company 
as a distinct possibility and nonetheless persisted in his 
conduct. In other words, the word 'recklessly' was used in 
the sense of dolus eventualis. 
Fagan J looked at dictionary definitions giving the ordinary 
sense of the word recklessly and also the case of S v Van 
Zyl11 where Steyn CJ found that the ordinary meaning of the 
words 'reckless' and 1.roekeloos' included 'cases of 
recklessness' which did not include as an element 'foresight 
of the consequences'. Steyn CJ had concluded that the 
orqinary meaning of recklessly included gross negligence with 
or without appreciation of risk. 
that: 
Fagan J accordingly held 
"The plain meaning of the word 'recklessly' does not 
15 
H 
1980. (1) SA 269 (C). 
1969 (1) SA 553 (A). 
12 
limit it to dolus eventualis. I can, furthermore, find 
no indication ins 424(3) that the legislature intend~d 
to place such restricted meaning upon the word. I can 
also find nothing disturbing in legislation aimed at 
punishing those who carry on the business of a company 
recklessly in the sense of grossly negligently ... I 
leave open the question of whether lesser negligence 
would amount to recklessness in terms of s 424." 17 
Fagan J accordingly held that the test of recklessness was an 
objective one and "what was required was proof that appellant 
acted recklessly judged by the standards of reasonable 
businessmen".11 
Williams states that an objective standard of the kind as 
laid down in Goertz's case is problematic in the sense that 
the_ word 'businessmen' would seem wide enough to embrace from 
the most naive, inexperienced and uneducated to tycoons of 
huge concerns. He states that: "Can a single unvarying, 
objective standard be distilled from such disparate 
elements."11 He admits, however, that Fagan J may not have 
intended to convey that the criterion for recklessness is 
17 
11 
1980 (1) SA 269 (c) at 271 H. 
Ibid p272 A. 
11 R C Williams: Liability for Reckless Trading by 
Companies: The South African Experience in (1984) 33 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 684 at 695. 
13 
wholly objective as the judge stated that, as quoted above, 
the plain meaning of the word 'recklessly' does not limit it 
to dolus eventualis. 
Williarns 20 argues that the maximum effectiveness would be 
achieved if recklessness were construed as connoting either a 
subjective or an objective appreciation of the risk. When 
one uses this test for recklessness, a person is regarded as 
having acted 'recklessly' either if he subjectively foresaw 
the possibility of the harm in question or if a reasonable 
person would have done so. 
Fagan Jin his judgment also stated that there was no need to 
prove dishonesty in order to gain a conviction under Section 
424(3) and stated that: 
"It is reasonably possible that the offence was 
committed, not through dishonesty, but by reason of 
appellant's blind faith in his own ability to pull the 
~ompany straight. The optimism was unfounded, but it 
may have been honest.~1 
F~gan J, as ;noted, left open the question whether any 
negLigence less than gross negligence could amount to 
20 Ibid p 692. 
21 1980 (1) SA 269 (c) at 274 C. 
H 
recklessness. In Fisheries Development Corporation v 
Jorgenson and Another, 22 Margo J answered this question in 
the negative holding that: 
"'Negligence' as 
from culpa 
a general concept embraces everything 
levissima to culpa latissima but 
'recklessness' in the ordinary sense, connotes at least 
culpa lata, 
meaning. " 23 
and 'recklessly' has a corresponding 
In this regard Margo J referred with approval to the views of 
A Hyman where he said: 
"if gross negligence is required as an element of 
recklessness (as it almost certairily is) the tests will 
vary greatly from case to case. The criteria will be in 
the scope of operations of the company concerned, the 
role, functions and powers of the director, the amount 
of the debt, the eAtent of the company's financial 
difficulties and the prospects, if any, of recovery and 
many other factors particular to claim involved. and the 
extent to which the director has departed from the 
standards of a reasonable man in regard thereto. No 
attempt at a closer definition of gross negligence is 
22 1980 (4) SA 156 (WLD). 
2J 1980 (4) SA 156 at 170 C-D. 
15 
feasible or advisable. 1124 
In Cronje NO v Stone en 'n Ande~' the court was- concerned 
with liability under s 424(1) of a director, who did not 
participate in the daily management of the company, which was 
left to a managing director. When it came to assessing the 
conduct of the director concerned, Le Roux J stated: 
"Ek is bereid, en ek dink dit is die regte benadering, 
dat 'n Hof, wanneer hy iemand se nalatigheid meet 
beoordeel homself tot 'n mate in die posisie van daardie 
persoon meet stel, en, hoewel dit nie 'n subjektiewe 
oordeel is nie, meen ek meet 'n H?f homself plaas in die 
posisie van die redelike persoon met dieselfde 
agtergrond en opvoedingskwalifikasies as die een wat hy 
meet beoordeel. 112 • 
Le Roux J. thus was prepared to take into account the 
director's experience and educational background· and also 
certain personal tragedies which had befallen her. However, 
le Roux J. stated that ultimately, like the director who had 
'blind faith in his own ability to pull the company straight' 
24 A Hyman: Directors Liability for Company's Debts in 
1980 SA Company Law Journal E-1 at E-7. 
25 1985 (3) SA 597 (T). 
21 1985 (3) SA 597 at 615 E-F. 
16 
in Goertz's case, the director concerned had blind faith in 
the reass9rances of the managing director, Stone, who in many 
respects misled her and gave her wrong information and 
concluded that, "sy nie voldoende op haar hoede was soos van 
haar verwag was nie, gesien haar posisie en gesien haar 
ervaring as 'n sakevrou nie".~ Le Roux J. stated further 
that she should have either resigned as a director to 
safeguard herself or put a stop to the conduct of the 
managing director in charge of the company by bringing an 
' application for liquidation herself. She was consequently 
found to have been knowingly a party to the carrying on of 
the business recklessly. 21 
Luiz 2 ' notes that it is interesting to see that the general 
approach adopted by Le Roux J. in assessing the recklessness 
of the conduct of the director who was not involved in the 
daily management of the company is largely in line with that 
laid down in s 214 of the English Insolvency Act which 
imposes civil liability on directors for wrongful trading. 
The liability for wrongful trading arises if the director 
knew or ought to have concluded that there were no reasonable 
prospects that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
27 
21 
Ibid at 616 I. 
Ibid p617 F. 
29 Stephanie Luiz: Extending the Liability of Directors in 
(1988) 105 South African Law Journal 788 at 793. 
17 
liquidation. 
In Ozinsky NO v Lloyd and Others>0 the plaintiff argued that 
certain trade debts of a company (by then in liquidation) 
were incurred fraudulently or recklessly in that the 
defendants (who were the directors of the company) knew that 
there existed no reasonable prospect of payment of these 
debts on due date or had no reasonable grounds to believe 
that the debts incurred would be paid on due date. It 
appeared that the directors had been advised by their auditor 
that the company, which was financed largely by way of 
shareholders' loans, was trading in insolvent circumstances. 
However, the auditor did not advise that the company should 
be liquidated largely because of the financial resources of 
the managing director (first defendant) which, as in the 
past, she was willing to make use of in order to assist the 
company. In addition to this, an increase in the authorised 
share cap1tal of the company and a conversion of all 
shareholders' loan accounts to paid-up share capital was 
planned as .part of a capital reconstruction scheme which 
would restore· the solvency of the company when implemented. 
Unfortunately, the company was placed in liquidation on the 
advice of. first defendant's attorney before the capital 
reconstruction scheme was implemented due to the fact that it 
was rumoured that one of their creditors was to apply for the 
JO 1992 {3) SA 396. 
18 
liquidation of the company. 
Van Deventer J considered the question of recklessness and 
··-
stated that the plaintiff bore the onus of proving at least 
gross negligence by the standard. He confirmed that the test 
to be applied is an objective- one; namely the standard of 
care that would be observed by a reasonable businessman in 
conducting the company's business in similar 
circµmstances. 31 The learned judge then stated that in 
ascertaining whether there had been gross negligence: 
"regard should be had to all factors particular to the 
company concerned, such as the scope of its business 
operations, its assets and liabilities, working capital, 
cash flow, access to capital and the prospects of 
payment when particular debts were incurred. Lastly, 
the Court should always be careful in adjudging conduct 
with the benefit of hindsight." 32 
Van Deventer J held further that: 
"if a company continues to carry on business and to 
incur debts when in the opinion of reasonable 
businessmen, standing in the shoes of the directors, 
Jl 
]2 
1992 (3) SA 396 at 414 C. 
Ibid at 414 D. 
19 
there would be no reasonable prospect of the creditors 
receiving payment when due, it will in general be a 
proper inference that the business is being carried 
recklessly. nu 
The learned judge concluded that, in his opinion, such an 
inference would not be justified due to his findings that the 
first defendant had personal resources at her disposal and 
would have continued to finance the company from her personal 
funds if necessary. A further question which the court had 
to consider arose from the fact that it was common cause at 
the conclusion of the trial that the defendants did not 
advise their prospective creditors that the company's 
liabilities exceeded its assets before purchasing goods on 
credit. The plaintiff argued that there is a general duty in 
these circumstances to disclose the insolvency of the company 
and non-disclosure in these circumstances would constitute 
fraudulent conduct. 
This submission. was based on certain dicta made by Stegmann 
J. in Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation Ltd 1989 (3) SA 
71 (T) at 104H-J, 106G-H, and 1121 - 113A and in the 
subsequent _judg~ent iri Singer NO v HJ Greef Electrical 
Contractors (Pty) Ltd 1990 (1) SA 530 (W) at 538G-H. The 
dictum at 106G-H in Ex parte Lebowa Development Corporation 
n Ibid at 414 G. 
20 
was as follows: 
"As indicated above when dealing with fraud, obtaining 
credit for a company without disclosing a known risk 
(such as must always be present when a company trades in 
insolvent circumstances) that the terms of payment may 
not be honoured is .fraud on the creditor, even if the 
company's representative honestly believed that the risk 
was not great and that the creditor would ultimately be 
paid. The fraud is the dishonest exposure of the 
creditor's economic interests to unauthorised risk. The 
honest belief that the creditor would not be prejudiced 
is no answer. The potential prejudice in exposing him 
to risk is enough." 
Van Deventer J interpreted Stegmann J dicta as laying down 
three general propositions. First, that trading by a company 
when it is insolvent is dishonest and unlawful unless the 
company either pays cash or discloses its insolvency before 
accepting goods on credit. Secondly, that directors or 
officers who know that a company's liabilities exceed its 
assets have a duty to disclose this fact whenever they buy on 
credit on behalf of the company. Thirdly, that failure by a 
director of a company to disclose the insolvency or to point 
out the relevant risks to creditors in such circumstances 
would per se amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation, 
21 
irrespective of the state of mind of the director. 14 
Van Deventer J stated that if the three aforementioned 
propositions is what Stegmann J intended to lay down he would 
have to disagree with him. With regard to the proposition, 
Van Deventer J agreed with Professor Christie's suggestion 
that the test adopted by Vieyra Jin Pretorius and Another v 
Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd (under judicial 
management) 1965 (3) SA 410 (W) at 488 is helpful. Vieyra J 
stated that there is a duty 
"involuntary reliance of 
to disclose where there is an 
the one party on the frank 
disclosure of certain facts· necessarily lying within the 
exclusive knowledge of the other such that, in fair dealing, 
the other's right to have such information communicated to 
him would be mutually recognised by honest men in the 
circumstances." 
According to Van Deventer J, suppliers do not involuntarily 
rely on the customers factual solvency whenever they supply 
on credit, they rely. on the company's future ability to pay 
basing their assessment of this on trade references ~nd 
credit records. Van Deve~ter stated further in regard to 
Stegmann J's views: 
"It seems to me, with respect, that Stegmann J in 
1992 (3) SA 396 at 417 B-D. 
22 
proceeding from the premise that non-disclosure of 
insolvency will as a rule amount to breach of a duty to 
disclose, which in turn will constitute 'dishonest 
exposure of the creditors economic interests' to 
unauthorised risk concluded that the latter element, 
namely dishonest exposure, would ipso iure establish 
intent to defraud. The learned judge thus overlooked 
the requirement of proof of conscious deceit involving 
the inevitable subjective test which he had in fact so 
clearly set out elsewhere in his judgment.~' 
Van Deventer J. stated with regard to Stegmann J's third 
above-mentioned proposition, that a party who relied on a 
material misrepresentation with intent to defraud as the 
plaintiff did, bore the onus of proving materiality and 
conscious deceit on a balance of probabilities. There was no 
general rule in our law that all material facts had to be 
disclosed prior to the conclusion of the contract. Thus, 
according to the learned judge, a failure to disclose a 
material fact would constitute fraudulent misrepresentation 
only when there was a duty to disclose and that the 
representer was aware of and appreciated its existence, and 
yet deliberately refrained from the disclosure in ·order to 
deceive (according to Trollip J. in S v Heller 1964 (1) SA 
524 at 537). 
Ibid at 418 D. 
23 
"KNOWINGLY A PARTY" 
Section 424(1) provides that the Court may declar1 that "any 
person who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the 
business in the manner aforesaid, shall be personally 
responsible, for all or any of the debts or other 
liabilities of the company as the Court may direct". In the 
recent case of Howard v Herrigel and Another NNO" Goldstone 
JA stated that in his opinion the word knowingly had to be 
. given the same meaning in both Section 424(1) ands 424(3) 
being the criminal offence. The learned judge referred to S 
v Parsons en 'n Ander 1980 (2) SA 397 (D) at 400F where Leon 
J held that the word meant "met kennis van die feite" and 
held that: 
"Having regard to the provisions of s 424 and to its 
purpose, to be entitled to an order the applicant must 
prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the person 
sought to be held liable had knowledge of the facts from 
which the conclusjon is properly to be drawn that the 
· business of the comp.any was or is being carried on 
recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of the 
company or credit~rs of any other person or for any 
fraudulent purp6se. It would not be necessary to go 
further and prove that the person also had actual 
u 1991 ·(2) SA 660 (AD). 
24 
knowledge of the legal consequences of those facts." 37 
Goldstone JA, however, held that knowledge of the aforesaid 
facts was not on its own sufficient. It was further 
necessary that the person in question was a 'party to the 
carrying-on of the business in the manner aforesaid'. Here 
Goldstone JA distinguished the case of Re Maidstone Building 
Provisions Ltd [19711 3 All ER 363 where the person sought to 
be held liable was a company secretary and Pennyquick V Chad 
said of the thens 332(1) of the Companies Act 1948: 
"The expression 'party to the carrying on of a business' 
is not, I think, a very familiar one but, so far as I 
can see, the expression 'party to' must on its natural 
meaning indicate no more than 'participates in', 'takes 
part in' or 'concurs in'. And that, it seems to'me, 
involves some positive steps of some nature. I do not 
think it can be said that someone is party to carrying 
on of a business if he takes no positive steps at 
al 1. nl• 
Goldstone jA held that, a director, in turn had an 
affirmative duty to safeguard and protect the affairs of a 
company and that it .followed that when the person sought to 
J7 
JI 
1991 (2) SA 660 at 673 I-J and 674 A. 
[19711 3 All ER 363 at 368 f-g. 
25 
be held liable under section 424(1) was a director, "he may 
well be a 'party' to the reckless or fraudulent conduct of 
the company's business even in the absence of some positive 
steps in the carrying on of the company's business. His 
supine attitude may ... even amount to concurrence in that 
conduct. Whether such an inference could properly be drawn 
will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case."n 
"PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ... FOR ALL OR ANY OF THE DEBTS" 
The final question to be addressed concerns the sanction in 
Section 424, as such, which is a.declaration that the person 
concerned "shall be personally responsible, without any 
limitation of liability, for all or any ~f the debts or other 
liabilities of the company as the court may direct." The 
question concerns, essentially, the application of moneys 
paid by a person pursuant to a declaration of personal 
responsibility for the company's debts. If the court makes 
an order imposing personal liability on a director, to whom 
must the money be paid? Can it be paid directly to the 
creditor who instituted the ~ction or to the liquidator, or 
directly into the coffers of the; company? Again, here, 
assistance can be gained :from English law which assistance is 
necessarily limited to claims made in the course of winding-
,, 
1991 (2) SA 660 at 674 H. 
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up. 
It was held by Eve Jin Re William C Leitch Brothers Ltd (No. 
-2) 40 that the then Section 275 of the Companies Act 1929, 
"· .. is not a section which regulates the procedure of an 
ordinary winding-up or controls the administration of the 
assets of the company. It is directed solely to the 
particular offenc~ of fraudulent trading and to attaching 
personal responsibility therefor to directors who knowingly 
have been parties thereto. It composes a liability, but does 
not purport to create any new rights for the creditors. It 
cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as a·section involving any 
departure from the general scheme of all modes of winding-up 
that is to say, a pari passu distribution of the assets. 
It may well be that the liability· it imposes ls measured by 
the debts of the defrauded creditors. But this is not of 
itself a ground for· holding that the ordinary rules of 
equality are to be disregarded and a preference created in 
favour of the defrauded class."41 
Thus Eve J ordered that. the moneys recovered by the 
liquidator undet a declaration of personal liability were to 
be dealt with as general assets of the company and applied 
40 
41 
(19321 All ~R 897. 
Ibid at 898. 
accordingly. 42 
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Thus, presumably under Section 424(1), 
payment would be made either to the liquidator or into the 
coffers of the company. 
The decision of Eve Jin Re William C Leitch Brothers (No. 2) 
was followed by Lord Russell in Re Cyona Distributors Ltd 41 
where he held that "the right to apply under Section 332 is 
an asset of the company and that a creditor applying is 
trustee in so doing for the company". 44 However, Lord 
Denning in turn, (supported by Lord Danckwerts) was of the 
opinion that, "the Court has full power to direct its 
destination and the Court can order the sum to go in 
discharge of the debt of any particular creditor; or that it 
shall go to a particular class of creditors, or to the 
liquidator so as to go into the general assets of the 
company. 11 U Lord Danckwerts stated that any creditor who 
brings the proceedings at his own expense should be entitled 
to his reward. 41 It is important to note, howev~r, that the. 
views of all three judges in Re Cyona Distributors Ltd are 
obiter. 
42 Ibid. 
u [1967] 1 All ER 281 ( c·. A. ) . 
u Ibid at 288 C. 
u Ibid at 284 B. 




In Re Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd,n Templeman J. accepted 
that the Court could direct payment to a creditor but, at the 
same time, held that it was essential for the creditor to 
advise the liquidator of the proceedings in order to give him 
an opportunity to intervene for the purpose of seeking 
payment to himself. 
It is submitted, with respect, correctly by the learned 
editors of Henochsberg," that in respect of s 424(1), the 
intention is that the Court should make a declaration in 
respect of a particular debt (or debts) and not in respect of 
a particular amount. Thus the learned editors submit that if 
a creditor obtains a declaration that the delinquent is 
personally responsible for the company's debt to such 
creditor, the Court can only direct payment to such creditor, 
whether or not the company is in liquidation or ~nder 
judicial management. Where the company is in liquidation or 
under judicial management, payment will usually be directed 
to the liquidator or judicial manager in order to protect all 
interested parties. 
47 (1978] 2 All ER 49. 
•• Phillip M Meskin · (Gen. Editor) Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act Vol II p 747-748. 
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AUSTRALIA 
As stated above, 0 the Australian fraudulent trading 
provisions were, like Section 424 of the Companies Act, 
inspired by the provisions of the United Kingdom Companies 
Legislation. Accordingly, s 374c(2) of the Uniform Companies 
Act 1961 made it an offence to be knowingly a party to an 
applicable company carrying on business with intent to 
defraud its creditors or for any other fraudulent purpose. 




convicted of such an 
officer 
"without any limitation of 
to be personally responsible 
liability" for payment to the 
company of an amount sufficient to satisfy all or such of the 
debts of the company as the court should direct. 
The Corporations Law of 1990 retains the principal structural 
elements of this provision. Thus, s 592(6) of the 
Corporation Law provides: 
"Where: 
(a) a company has done an act (including the making of 
a contract or the enteririg int6 of a transaction) 
with intent to defraud creditors of the company or 
u 
of any other person or. for any other 
purpose; and 
Vide p :2. 
fraudulent 
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(b) the company was at the time when it does the act, 
or becomes at a later time, a company to which this 
section applies; 
any person who was knowingly concerned in the doing of the 
act with that intent or for that purpose contravenes this 
subsection". 
The first observation is that the section is confined to a 
"company to which this section applies". Section 589(1) 
defines the companies to which s 592(6) refers. It declares 
that the section applies to companies which have been wound 
up, are in the course of being wound up, have been or are 
under official management, whose affairs have been or are 
under investigation, to whose property a receiver or receiver 
and manager has at any time been appointed, which have ceased 
to carry on business or are unable to pay their debts, or 
have entered into a compromise or arrangement with creditors. 
Thus, unlike Section 424 of the Companies Act, which applies 
to companies whether or not they are in the process of 
winding up, the Australian fraudulent trading provisions are 
confined to companies in certain prescribed circumstances. 
This restriction is ~trengthened by the fact that certain 
deeming provisions apply. Thus, for example, 1n terms of 
Section 589(3) of the Corporations Law a company is deemed to 
31 
have ceased to carry on business if and only if the Corporate 
Affairs Commission has: 
A 
"(a) sent to the company-~y post a letter under s 572(1) 
and has not, within the next succeeding period of 
one month from the date of the letter, received an 
answer to the effect that the company is carrying 
on business; or 
(b) published a notice under s 572(3)". 
consequence of this restricted definition is that 
significant delays are faced. In this case, for instance, it 
is at a minimum one month from the time the s 572(1) letter 
is posted, that the requirements of s 592(6) are met. 
Section 592(6) makes provision merely for a criminal offence. 
The impoaition of personal liability of a director requires 
further court proceedings and, is in fact made dependent upon 
the prospective defendant first having been convicted of the 
criminal offence provided for in the aforesaid section. 
Section 593(2) of the Corporations Law accordingly provides: 
"Where a person has been convicted of an offence under 
Section 592(6) the Court ... may, if .it thinks it proper 
to do so, declare that the person shall be 
iJ 
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personally responsible without any limitation of 
liability for the payment to the company of the amount 
required to satisfy so much of the debts of the company 
as the Court thinks proper." 
Thus, if there is no prosecution and hence no conviction, the 
civil remedy is altogether lost. Once again, considerable 
delays are created in that the civil proceedings must wait 
until the slow-turning wheels of criminal justice have 
completed their work. 
It is also strange as noted by Herzberg' 0 that s 592(1) of 
the Corporations Law imposes automatic civil liability for 
the unreasonable incurring of a debt while this is not the 
case with the more serious offence of fraudulent trading 
under Section 592(6). 
Rogers J. in 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Watt (1985) 9 ACLR 203 at 
207 also pointed to another drafting difficulty which 
.potentially exposes directors to double liability. The 
learned judge noted that under s 557(2) of the Companies 
Code, the predecessor of s 593(2), a fraudulent director can 
be ordered to make payment t6 his company to satisfy its 
debts. It is possible that the director could also be 
'
0 A Herzberg: Insolvent Trading in (1991) 9 Company and 
Securities Law Journal 285 at 287. 
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subject to an earlier civil claim by a creditor under s 556 
of the Companies Code (nows 592(1) of the Corporations Law) 
in respect of the same debt. Thus, Rogers J. noted: 
"Again, s 557 deals with an obligation to pay the 
company. Is this additional to the obligation imposed 
upon say a director bys 556 to make payment direct to 
the creditor? Is on payment a discharge of the other 
· obligation? 1151 
As far as the central element of fraudulent trading is 
concerned, namely the intent to defraud or fraudulent purpose 
Kitto J; in Hardie v Hansod 2 held that: 
"an actual purpose, consciously pursued of ~windling 
creditors out of their money had to be established" .' 3 
The Australian law thus adopts a purely subjective standard 
and as noted above," genuine optimism on the part of 
directors, though completely confounded, will negate an 
intent to defraud~ Thus, in Hardie v Hanson, the director 
escaped liability since his intent was shown to be no more 
,z 
9] 
(1985) 9 ACLR 203 at 207. 
(1960) 105 CLR 451. 
Ibid at 463. 
Vide p9. 
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sinister than an attempt to trade out of the company's 
difficulties for the 
creditors. 
general benefit of members and 
A further anomaly in the Australian fraudulent trading 
provisions is that if a company incurs a debt fraudulently, 
Section 593(2) lays down that 'where a person has been 
convicted of an offenca~under s 592(6), the court may declare 
that person to be personally responsible for the payment to 
the company of that debt, while, on the other hand, s 592(1) 
and 593(1) of the Corporations Law provide that where a 
company incurs a debt in circumstances where there are no 
reasonable grounds to expect that the company will be able to 
pay all its debts as they fall due, the court may declare a 
person convicted of an offence under s 592(1) · to be 
personally responsible to the particular creditor for payment 
of that debt. Thus, the Corporations Law treats a creditor 
who is a victim of the less heinous wrong more generously 
than a victim of the more heinous wrong, namely fraudulent 
trading. 
Thus, as Williams notes," the creditor has scarcely any 
incentive to make use of the fraudulent trading provisions of 
the Corporations Law. He obtains no financial advantage from 
" R C Williams: Fraudulent Trading in (1986) 4 Company 
and Security La~ Journal 14 at 21. 
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a criminal prosecution under s 592(6) and any money recovered 
from the defendant in further civil proceedings under Section 
593(2) afterwards is paid to the company. Consequently the 
creditor would be well advised to allege the lesser wrong, 
namely the unreasonable incurring of a debt rather than 
fraudulent trading. 
In one respect, the provisions of the Australian Corporations 
Law with respect to fraudulent trading are clear. Section 
592(6) applies to "any act". Thus it can apply to a single 
transaction. As noted above,'' however~ the South African 
courts have in Gordon NO and Rennie v Standard Merchant Bank 
Ltd and Others" held that the words 'any business' ins 424 
cover a single transaction. 
The concept of reckless trading was not introduced into 
Australian Law buts 592(1) and 593(1) of the Corporations 
Law which impose criminal and civil liability have 
considerable common ground with the concept of reckless 
trading. It is the presence of an intent to defraud which 
chiefly distinguishes fraudulent trading from reckless 
trading. It is also the main feature distinguishing 
fraudulent· conduct under s 592(6) of the Corporations Law 
from the unreasonable incurring of a debt tinder~ 592(1). 
Vide p5. 
57 1984 (2) SA 519 (C)d 
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Thuss 592(1) of the Corporations Law provides: 
"Where: 
(a) a company has incurred a debt 
(b) immediately before the time .when the debt was 
incurred; 
(i) there were reasonable grounds to expect that 
the company will not be able to pay all its 
debts as and when they become due; or 
(ii) there were reasonable grounds to expect that, 
if the company incurs the debt, it will not be 
able to pay all its debts as and when they 
become due; and 
(c) the company was, at the time when the debt was 
incurred, or becomes at a later time, a company to 
which this section applies: 
any person who was a director of the company, or took part in 
the management of the company, at the time when the debt is 
incurred contravenes this subsection and the company and that 
person ... are jointly and severally liable for the payment 
of the debt". 
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One of the major differences between the present unreasonable 
incurring of debt provisions and their Uniform Companies Act 
1961 predecessors, is that conviction of the s 592(1) offence 
is not a necessary condition for the imposition of p~rsonal 
liability of directors for the debt. Section 592(1), in 
addition to creating a criminal offence, declares that 
directors are jointly and severally liable with their company 
for the debt incurred where the requirements of that section 
otherwise apply. 
However, the fact that s 592(1) gives rise to both criminal 
and civil consequences has given ris~ to problems, as even 
though s 592(4) makes it clear that civil liability is 
established on a balance of probabilities, the construction 
of s 592(1) in civil proceedings has, in some cases, been 
coloured by the fact that it is also a penal provision. For 
example, in Metal Manufacturers v Lewis," Hodgson J. at 
first instance held thats 556(1) of the Companies Code, the 
predecessor .and equivalent of s 592(1), requires the same 
strict construction in civil cases as would : apply in a 
prosecution of a person fbr the offence. For this reason, if .. 
the section is capable of differing interpr~tations the 
approach adopted by the courts in civil proceed~ngs will be 
the one which favours the defendant. 




A further observation is that prima facie liability in a 
director can be established under s 592(1) without proof that 
the individual had any personal knowledge of, let alohe 
involvement in, the incurring of the relevant debt as there 
is no requirement that the director was 'knowingly a party' 
as laid down_ in s 424. Proof by the plaintiff of the 
substantive elements of s 592(1) shifts onto the director the 
burden of exculpation. It is only here that questions arise 
as to the director's knowledge of and participation in the 
incurring of the relevant debt. Thus, it is a defence to 
proceedings under the subsection if the director proves: 
(a) that th~ debt was incurred without his or her express or 
implied authority or consent; or 
(b) ~hat when the debt was incurred he or she did not have 
reasonable cause to expect either that the company would 
not be able to pay all its debts as and.when they became 
due or would be unable to do so if the debt was 
incurred." 
Section 592(1) sets three requirements before a creditor's 
cause of. action is complete. The first is contained in 
Section 592(l)(a) which requires proof that _"a company has 
incurred a debt". Previous provisions referred to 
" s 592 (2) of the Corporations Law. 
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"contracting (rather than incurring) a debt". WilliamslO 
argues that the expression "incurs a debt" means that the 
section is unequivocally confined to debts which a company 
incurs voluntarily, as a matter of choice, and that only 
contractual obligations involving the payment of money fall 
within its scope. By way of contrast, the reference ins 424 
of the Companies Act to debts or other liabilities is 
generally assumed to extend beyond contractual debts. 
The substantive element for the imposition of both criminal 
and civil liability under the unreasonable incurring of a 
debt provision is set out ins 592(l)(b). This requires 
proof that immediately before the time when the debt was 
incurred: 
"Ci) there were reasonable grounds to expect that the 
company will not be able to pay all its debts as 
and when they became due; or 
(ii) there were reasonable grounds to expect that, if 
the company incurs the debt, it will not be able to 
pay all its debts as and when they become due". 
The question whether a company has the ability:.to pay its 
'
0 RC Williams: Fraudulent Trading in (1986) 4 Company 
and Securities Law Journal 14 at.23. 
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debts is not determined simply on the basis of a surplus of 
assets over liabilities at any particular instant. A 
creditor has the onerous burden of providing evidence of the 
company's financial position at the time when the debt was 
incurred. As Mahoney JA in Dunn v Shapowloffu stated: 
"What will constitute an ability to pay must be 
determined in a realistic way, by reference to the facts 
of the particular case, after taking into consideration, 
inter alia, the company's assets and liabilities and the 
nature of them, and the nature and circumstances of the 
company's activities The cash expected to be 
available at the particular time will be relevant, but 
not necessarily determinative. It will, for example, be 
relevant to consider whether the company could be 
expected to pay the debt,.by borrowing; whether, if it 
must realise assets to raise the money to pay the debt, 
' it can be expected to do this by the relevant time and 
at what price; and whether what it will have to do in 
paying and being able to pay the debt will involve the 
company or its officers in voidable transactions, 
improper preferences, or breach of obligations under the 
general law or relevant legislation. It would, I think, 
be proper in a particular case, for account to be taken 
u [1978] 2 NSWLR 235. 
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appropriately of a promise, legally binding or 
otherwise, to provide money or financial assistance, by 
loan, subscription for share capital, or by the 
provision of a guarantee". 12 
Section 592{1){b) also specifies that there must be 
"reasonable grounds" to expect the company's inability to 
pay~ This wording indicates that a company's inability to 
pay its debts is determined on objective criteria of 
reasonableness. The section does not, however, state what 
standard of reasonableness applies. Foster J. in 3M 
Australia v Kemish 13 held that the reasonableness of the 
gr-0unds relied upon by the prosecution and/or civil plaintiff 
had to be judged by the standard appropriate to a director of 
ordinary competence. Foster J. held that: 
"Clearly 
grounds' 
material that could 
for expectation by 
provide 'reasonable 
a person with the 
qualifications of an auditor, could be very different 
from material that would provide such grounds for an 
office boy. I am satisfied from a reading of the whole 
of the subsection, and having regard to the fact that it 
prescribes an offence, that the reasonableness o~ the 
grounds relied on by the prosecution and/or civil 
12 Ibid at 244. 
IJ {1986) 10 ACLR 371. 
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plaintiff, must be judged by the standard appropriate to 
a director or manager of ordinary competence". 14 
This formulation was not, however~ followed in a recent 
decision of Tadgell J. in the Supreme Court of Victoria in 
the Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich and Others. 0 
Tadgell J. decided that s 556 (the predecessor of s 592(1)) 
was drafted on the assumption that directors would comply 
with their general law and statutory duties. Accordingly, 
the ascertainment of whether there existed reasonable grounds 
of expectation was to be considered from the perspective of a 
director properly performing his or her duties. Tadgell J. 
held that in relation to a claJm made against a non-executive 
director: 
"the plaintiff must prove facts which, immediately 
before the time when the company incurred the relevant 
debt, gave a person seeking properly to perform the 
duties of a non-executive director of that company 
reasonable grounds to say: 'I expect that the company 
will not be able to pay all its debts as and when they 




Ibid at p373 . 
(1991) 5 ACSR 115. 
Ibid at 124. 
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Tadgell J stated in relation to the test laid down in 3M 
Australia v Kemish that: 
"To speak of a director of ordinary, r~asonable or 
average competence or prudence, or indeed of an ordinary 
reasonable or average director, is to give no very 
useful description whereas a person seeking properly to 
perform the duties of a director ~fa particular company 
can be identified by reference to more specific criteria 
of which ordinariness, reasonableness and averageness 
are, or may be, merely ingredients."11 
Tadgell J. noted that while the question of what constitutes 
the proper performance of the duties of a director of a 
particular company will be dictated by a host of 
circumstances, every director was now expected by law to be 
capable of understanding his company's affairs to the extent 
of actually reaching an- informed opinion of its financial 
capacity. Tadgell J. stated that: 
"I think it follows that he is required by law to be 
capable of keeping abreast of the company's affairs, and 
sufficiently abreast of them to act appropriately _if 
there are reasonable grounds to expect the company ~ill 
not be able to pay all its debts in due course and he 
11 Ibid at 125. 
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has reasonable cause to expect it". 1 ' 
Tadgell J. concluded that the plaintiff had proved that on or 
after 31 May 1988 immediately before the time wheh each 
relevant debt was incurred, the requirements of s 556(1) (now 
Section 592(1) of the Corporations Law) were ~et. Directors 
acting properly would have demanded the preparation of, and 
would have considered, adequate management accounts. Tadgell 
J •. noted further that most, if not all, of the statutory 
requirements of the Companies Code were breached in relation 
to the company's 1986 and 1987 accounts and that the 
directors did not become aware of the qualified auditor's 
reports in relation to these accounts until December 1988. 
Tadgell J. stated: 
"I cannot countenance the notion that a director should 
be heard legitimately to say that he carried on as a 
director, and involved himself in the company's affairs 
in that capacity, for any appreciable time after an 
annual general meeting had received, approved and 
adopted ~nriual accounts and an auditor's report thereon 
and yet did not know the substance of what both the 
accounts and the auditor's report had to say. It is of 
the essence of the responsibilities of the directors of 
a company such as the National Safety Council Victorian 
.. Ibid at 126. 
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Division that they should take reasonable steps to place 
themselves in a position to guide and monitor the 
management of the company by reference to information 
appropriate for the purpose"." 
Where the requirements of s_ 592(l)(a) and (b) are satisfied, 
Section 592(l)(c) then specifies that liability, whether 
civil or criminal, arises only where "the company was~ at the 
time when the debt was incurred, or becomes at a later time, 
a company to which this section applies". 
As with the Australian fraudulent trading provisions, Section 
589(1) defines the companies to which s 592(l)(c) refers. 
Again, the section is confined to companies in certain 
prescribed circumstances and the same deeming provisions 
apply as discussed above. ' 0 
" 
,o 




Section 424, in particular in comparison to the Australian 
fraudulent trading and unreasonable incurring of debt 
provisions, seems to be a "potent weapon in the hands of 
creditors" as.stated by Professor Gower in relation to the 
fraudulent trading section of the United Kingdom 
legislation. 71 The section applies to all _companies without 
restriction and not to companies, like the Australian 
provisions, in certain prescribed circumstances. 
The emphasis in the Australian unreasonable incurring of a 
debt provisions on incurring debts favours trade creditors 
over other types of creditors and, in this regard, it is to 
be regretted that although the Australian Law Reform 
Commission has proposed thats 556 of the Companies Code (now 
s 592 of the Corporation Law) be totally restructured, the 
same inherent design defect occurs. 
It is strange, in the light of the fact that our courts have 
expressed a willingriess to give the words of s 424 "their 
full width", that the section has not been seized upon more 
often by creditors, particularly in these harsh economic 
times. It is true that at the moment uncertainty exists 
71 Gower: The Principles of Modern Company Law 14th 
Edition p 115 . 
47 
between the views of Stegmann J. in the Transvaal and Van 
Deventer J. in the Cape. In this regard, it is to be noted 
that an appeal has been noted from the judgment of Van 
Deventer J. in the Cape to the Appellate Division. It is 
hoped that by clarifying the confusion and providing 
certainty, s 424 might truly become the "potent weapon" its 
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